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A Framework for the Game-theoretic Analysis
of Censorship Resistance
Abstract: We present a game-theoretic analysis of optimal
solutions for interactions between censors and censorship re-
sistance systems (CRSs) by focusing on the data channel used
by the CRS to smuggle clients’ data past the censors. This
analysis leverages the inherent errors (false positives and neg-
atives) made by the censor when trying to classify traffic as ei-
ther non-circumvention traffic or as CRS traffic, as well as the
underlying rate of CRS traffic. We identify Nash equilibrium
solutions for several simple censorship scenarios and then ex-
tend those findings to more complex scenarios where we find
that the deployment of a censorship apparatus does not qualita-
tively change the equilibrium solutions, but rather only affects
the amount of traffic a CRS can support before being blocked.
By leveraging these findings, we describe a general framework
for exploring and identifying optimal strategies for the censor-
ship circumventor, in order to maximize the amount of CRS
traffic not blocked by the censor. We use this framework to an-
alyze several scenarios with multiple data-channel protocols
used as cover for the CRS. We show that it is possible to gain
insights through this framework even without perfect knowl-
edge of the censor’s (secret) values for the parameters in their
utility function.
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1 Introduction
Internet censorship resistance is a relatively recent field, yet
it has been gaining prominence in recent times due to the
increased censorship activity by various regimes around the
world. This activity has given rise to an influx of interest,
funding, and research effort in producing circumvention solu-
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tions to stymie those censorship efforts. Most of the research
and engineering effort has been focused on understanding the
technological aspects of 1) the myriad censorship techniques
and attacks and 2) the equally many censorship resistance sys-
tems that circumvent them. However, there is a striking lack
of research effort and insight into the behavior of the censor
and circumventor and their interaction since, so far, the liter-
ature has treated that aspect of Internet censorship as a black
box [21]. In this work, we investigate this aspect of censor-
ship through the lens of game-theoretic analysis because it
is an apt tool for modeling the interaction between two non-
cooperative self-interested entities. Since the attack space is
large, we focus on analyzing the data channel—the commu-
nication between the client and a destination outside of the
censor’s jurisdiction. This data channel is used by a censor-
ship resistance system (CRS); the CRS typically disguises this
data channel so that the client appears to be using some in-
nocuous protocol to speak to some unblocked server, but in
reality, the CRS is connecting the client to an Internet server
of her choice. Our work is timely because there is currently
a lot of activity within the community to develop better de-
signs and implementations that address censorship threats to
the data channel [11, 13, 18, 19, 24, 36, 38]. Specifically, we
seek to understand how the success (or failure) of the censor-
ship apparatus, measured by its error rates (i.e., false positives
and negatives), affect the censor’s behavior and if, and how,
the circumvention traffic proportion of a CRS (which affects
the censor’s error rates) can be used as a parameter in CRS
designs.
Our contributions are:
1. A game-theoretic analysis leading to the identification and
description of Nash equilibria of linear utility functions
that allow a non-zero proportion of CRS traffic to flow in
the one-shot and repeated game scenarios;
2. The conclusion that fielding a censorship apparatus does
not change the equilibrium solutions above, but only the
threshold circumvention traffic rate;
3. A framework for exploring and identifying data channel
protocols that provide useful circumvention traffic rates
for a given censor type and use case;
4. The insight that throttling the CRS client’s network usage
is an optimal solution but opens up the CRS to a particular
censor attack;
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5. An alternative mechanism to throttling that provides ro-
bustness to the censor attack above; and
6. The insight that cover protocol ratios can play a significant
role in the resulting equilibria.
2 Background
Game theory is the study of how groups of rational, self-
interested entities behave in response to one another’s ac-
tions. In the context of censorship-resistant communications,
a game-theoretic approach can be used to assess the optimal
behavior of a rational censor and the designers of a CRS.
To facilitate this, we will analyze the behavior of the
two parties, or players from now onwards, in increasingly de-
tailed versions of an abstract “censorship game”, designed to
capture the fundamentals of censorship resistance dynamics,
while still being simple enough to readily analyze. This anal-
ysis serves to reveal the essential components of the problem
domain.
These players try to maximize their benefits by thinking
strategically about their actions, using information that they
have about the environment and the other players. A central
assumption is the theory of “rational choice”, which states that
an entity seeks to maximize its utility independent of the other
players’ utilities [23, 33] and will chose an action that is at
least as good as any other action available to them. The utili-
ties can be modeled by a utility function (U) that assigns car-
dinal utilities to ordinal values. That is, if a player prefers out-
come a over outcome b and outcome b over outcome c then
the utilities are ordered U(a) > U(b) > U(c). Each player
has an action space, which is the set of actions the player can
take, and each player adopts a strategy describing which ac-
tions they will play under what conditions. A game consists of
a set of action spaces for each player, and a function mapping
specifications of a strategy for each player to outcomes.
2.1 Technological Limits
The censor and its apparatus have limitations such as the com-
putational and memory costs of real-time processing, amongst
other considerations. It is important, then, to take into account
the rate at which objects of interest are misclassified. The two
types of errors—false positives and false negatives—govern
the confidence the censor has in their censorship apparatus.
The prevalence of each of these type of errors provides an
important input for both the censor and the circumventor in
defining their respective strategies.
2.1.1 False Positives
From the censor’s perspective, false positives are the non-
circumvention traffic, and users, that were misclassified and
blocked—the collateral damage. The censor naturally seeks to
keep this as low as possible. As noted by Khattak et al. [21],
the collateral damage strategy has been leveraged by numer-
ous censorship resistance systems, most recently by meek [15]
and CloudTransport [7], both of which leverage popular cloud
hosting services. These services are considered too important
for the censor to block for risk of incurring economic losses
to local businesses that utilize them for their operations. How-
ever, in most cases the circumventor assumes an all-or-nothing
approach to censorship, which can be limiting when the censor
is content with partial blocking. [22]
2.1.2 False Negatives
The censor tries to prevent as many clients, or as much traffic,
as it can from circumventing its blocks—termed information
leakage. Due to the limits of technology it is unable to identify
all of them. The circumventor’s aim is to have as much, if not
all, of its traffic classified as a (false) negative. Strategies that
obfuscate telltale features of CRS traffic to make them indis-
tinguishable from non-CRS traffic, as well as steganographic
and encryption techniques, are all instrumental in achieving
this goal.
Since the circumventor is a rational player its aim is not
to produce collateral damage, or indeed to explicitly reduce
the censor’s utility. It is only concerned with maximizing its
own utility, independent of the censor’s utility. While collat-
eral damage may be incidentally produced by this maximiza-
tion, the damage is not taken into account by the circumventor
when making decisions. The setting we focus on is one where
the circumventor is interested in maximizing the utility solely
derived from the use of the CRS.
3 Censorship Games
In our model, a censorship game is a game played between
two players. One player, called the censor, has comprehensive
control over the network of a target area (its sphere of influ-
ence, or SoI), and wishes to prevent certain undesirable com-
munications from being transmitted over that network, while
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maximizing the throughput of non-circumvention traffic.1 The
other player, called the circumventor, wishes to send censored
traffic (e.g., political speech that the censor disapproves of)
over the censor-controlled channel, and may or may not care
about the level of throughput for non-circumvention commu-
nications on the censor-controlled network.
The circumventor is able to disguise circumvention, or
covert, traffic to match a certain profile of non-circumvention
cover traffic, and exercises control over the amount of traf-
fic that is sent by altering the circumvention traffic proportion
(CTP) of the censorship resistance system (CRS) they have
deployed. The CTP is a fraction of the total traffic, which in-
cludes both circumvention and non-circumvention traffic. The
circumvention traffic proportion can be set to any value in the
range 0 ≤ CTP ≤ CTPmax < 1, where CTPmax is the as-
sumed maximum amount of traffic, as a fraction of the total
traffic, that the CRS could transmit if it were fully utilized.
The censor possesses the ability to shut off all traffic (both
non-circumvention and circumvention). The censor may also,
but not always, possess the ability to differentiate the circum-
ventor’s traffic from the cover traffic that it is disguised as, by
means of some censorship apparatus, usually in the form of
a firewall or deep packet inspection (DPI) system capable of
differentiating suspicious traffic based on the expected finger-
prints of circumvention traffic. This ability to differentiate is
prone to errors classified as false positives or false negatives.
Each player has a separate utility function that maps from
the choice of action taken by both players to the total reward
acquired by one of them.
The game is played in a series of discrete rounds, happen-
ing in sequential discrete timesteps. At the start of each round,
both players simultaneously select an action from their action
set, on the basis of the actions selected by the two players in all
previous rounds of the game, and on the basis of the players’
utility functions and calculations.
In a censorship game, a strategy for the circumventor is a
specification of how the circumvention traffic proportion pa-
rameter will be set at different timesteps in the game, and a
strategy for the censor is a specification at different timesteps
in the game of whether the channel will be left open (allow-
ing all traffic through) or not, and whether or not the apparatus
will be used, if it is available. In this setting, we do not model
either circumventor or censor expending resources to develop
better CRSs or apparatus as the game progresses. For example,
a strategy for the censor might be to leave the channel open if
the circumvention traffic proportion of the circumventor was
1 This is a simplification since the censor may also care about other as-
pects that contribute to its utility, such as international perception, political
fallout, and citizen unhappiness, to name a few.
below a certain level in all previous time steps, and to close it
permanently otherwise. An example strategy for the circum-
ventor might be to send no traffic at all for some time, and
then send a very large burst of traffic. A strategy profile is a
specification of a strategy for each player.
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile where neither
player could improve their utility by unilaterally adopting a
different strategy. This is a stable point of the game. We will
characterize the behaviors of the two agents in terms of the
Nash equilibria of the game.
We also assume in our analysis throughout section 4 and
section 5 that both the censor and circumventor have perfect
information about each other. That is, both players know what
the other has done (but not necessarily what they will do next),
and knows the exact utility function and utility function pa-
rameters being used by the other player. This is a common
assumption in studying equilibria in repeated games [28]. We
believe this assumption is plausible because the utility func-
tions involved are not overly complex, and the both parties can
observe the past actions of their opponents (or similar entities)
to arrive at an accurate estimate of the parameters involved.
Naturally, any predictions made by our model with inaccurate
estimates of the needed parameters will tend to produce inac-
curate predictions about the locations of inflection points in the
players’ behaviors, but the general trends will still be correct.
Additionally, we assume that both the censor and the cir-
cumventor have knowledge about the amount of circumven-
tion and non-circumvention traffic that is successfully trans-
ported. While this information should be easy for a circum-
ventor to obtain, the censor may not know how much circum-
vention traffic is getting through. We note that, ultimately, a
real-world censor may have many out-of-band methods for in-
ferring this parameter. For example, a nation-state censor may
arrest political dissidents for other reasons, and thus intercept
hardware being used for circumvention. Alternatively, the cen-
sor may notice external effects from the passed information,
on the basis of which it can decide whether too much traffic is
passing. In some cases, circumventors may make this informa-
tion publicly available, e.g. VPN Gate [37] and Tor [34]. We
consider the question of exactly how the censor infers these
parameters to be out of scope for this paper, and include these
suggestions simply to show that our assumption is not entirely
unreasonable. An expansion of our results in the framework
of Bayesian game theory could accommodate uncertainty in
these parameters.
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4 A Simple Censor Model
We begin by considering the simplest version of the game
where the censorship resistance system uses only one chan-
nel, carrying only one type of traffic; for example, the CRS
could be disguising is circumvention traffic as Skype traf-
fic [20, 24, 26]—in this case, the “channel” would consist of
all Skype traffic crossing the censor’s SoI boundary. We as-
sume that, absent the traffic of the circumventor, this channel
carries a total amount of cover traffic L. We normalize both
CTP and L by setting L = 1−CTP . In this section the CRS
controls CTP and denotes the amount of circumvention traffic
that will be allowed to enter the censor’s network.
We now proceed with closed-form analysis of the game in
three steps, gradually increasing the complexity of the model.
4.1 Step 1: Single Round, No Apparatus
In this version of the game, the two players play just one round
of the game, and the censor has no access to an apparatus that
would allow it to differentiate between the traffic of the cir-
cumventor and the traffic of other uninvolved users.
The action space of the censor, denoted Xcen, consists of
two strategies: 1 and 0 (the channel being On and Off). Playing
“On” means the censor allows all traffic on the channel to pass
through unimpeded, while “Off” means all traffic transmission
is halted.
The action space of the circumventor is a real number
CTP ∈ [0, 1], which is the amount of circumvention traffic
the circumventor chooses to send (as a fraction of the total
traffic). Often we will assume the circumventor is unable to
send more than some fraction of total traffic that is less than
one, and so will limit the action space to CTP ∈ [0,CTPmax]
instead, where CTPmax is the maximum portion of total net-
work traffic that the circumvention traffic can potentially be.
The utility functions of the censor and circumventor are
respectively given by:
Ucen = (−αactXcen + αbct(1−Xcen))CTP+
(βantXcen − βbnt(1−Xcen))(1− CTP)
(1)
Ucir = (γactXcen − γbct(1−Xcen))CTP+
(δantXcen − δbnt(1−Xcen))(1− CTP)
(2)
Variables α[act,bct], β[ant,bnt], γ[act,bct], and δ[ant,bnt]
are parameters that depend on the specific players of the game.
The subscripts act and bct stand for allow and block circum-
vention traffic, respectively. The subscripts ant and bnt stand
for allow and block non-circumvention traffic, respectively.
The αact and αbct are the loss, or gain, of utility to the cen-
sor of allowing, or blocking, one unit of circumvention traffic,
respectively. Similarly, βant and βbnt are the gain, or loss, in
utility to the censor of having one unit of non-circumvention
traffic transported via, or blocked on, the channel, respectively.
The ratios of αact to βant and of αbct to βbnt characterize dif-
ferent types of censors. For example, an employer interested
in reducing employee idleness by preventing communication
with social media sites, but ensuring that productive online ac-
tivities are not affected, might have a relatively low αact, but
a relatively high βant. In contrast, a military agency trying to
censor leakage of state secrets might have a very high αbct rel-
ative to their βbnt parameter. The circumventor’s counterpart
parameters γact and γbct show the utility gained, or lost, by
the circumventor of a single unit of circumvention traffic to be
transported, or blocked, respectively. Similarly, δant and δbnt
show the utility gained, or lost, by the circumventor of a single
unit of cover traffic to be transported, or blocked, respectively.
All of these parameters can be normalized to the range [0, 1],
where 0 means ambivalence and 1 means strong sensitivity.
We consider the case where both δ parameters are zero.
This case reflects, many but not all, CRS designs (e.g. Tor [12],
Psiphon [30], or CloudTransport [7]) that are not concerned
with the fallout of CRS usage; further designs in the literature
do not provide technical provisions to reduce the impact of the
fallout on non-CRS traffic; e.g., the examples above. We also
assume that the parameter γbct is zero, reflecting those CRS
designs that are ambivalent to blocked CRS traffic (again see
exmaples above); that is, what matters directly to the circum-
ventor is the amount of circumvention traffic allowed through
the censor’s firewalls, not the amount that is blocked.
However, it may be the case that there are CRS designs
where these assumptions do not hold, for instance where the
cost of blocked traffic is not negligible to the circumventor, or
for a “spiteful” circumventor that gains positive utility from
the censor blocking non-circumvention traffic, then the results
would need to be extended in a more complex analysis, left for
future work.
Thus the circumventor’s utility function is reduced to:
Ucir = γactXcenCTP (3)
4.1.1 Analysis
In this section we show that in a single-round game there is
only one Nash equilibrium that leaves the channel open.
Theorem 1. In a single-round game, there only exists one
Nash equilibrium that leaves the channel open.
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Proof. It is apparent that the censor maximizes its utility by
playing “On” if βant(1 − CTP) − αactCTP > αbctCTP −
βbnt(1−CTP), and “Off” otherwise.2 Consequently, the Cen-
sor leaves the channel open if it believes the circumventor will
play CTP ≤ βant+βbntαact+αbct+βant+βbnt ; or CTP ≤ F for brevity,
where F = βant+βbntαact+αbct+βant+βbnt .
If the players know each others’ strategies, the utility of
the circumventor is maximized by setting CTP = F. How-
ever, this solution is actually not a Nash equilibrium of the
game. This is because the censor and circumventor decide
their actions simultaneously, and so do not know each oth-
ers’ actions in advance. Given that the censor plays “On”,
the circumventor’s best response is actually to pick CTP =
CTPmax, since this maximizes the utility of the circumven-
tor. Consequently, the profile where the censor plays “On” and
the circumventor plays CTP = F is not a Nash equilibrium.
To find a Nash equilibrium, we note that if the cen-
sor plays “Off”, the circumventor is equally happy to play
CTP = CTPmax instead of any other value of CTP (since
all settings of CTP yield zero utility). This means the circum-
ventor should play CTP = CTPmax regardless of what the
censor does, simplifying the game considerably. Knowing that
the circumventor’s utility is maximized by playing CTPmax
regardless, the censor would choose to play “On” if and only
if CTPmax < F . In a game where this holds true, the only
Nash equilibrium is for the censor to leave the channel open,
and the circumventor to play CTPmax. Otherwise, the only
Nash equilibrium is for the censor to close the channel and for
the circumventor to play CTPmax.
Thus, we can see that, in this simplified game, the Nash equi-
librium depends on both the maximum amount of traffic the
circumventor can send, and on the tradeoff between the costs
and benefits to the censor for allowing and blocking circum-
vention traffic versus keeping non-circumvention traffic flow-
ing.
However, in practice, we rarely observe the equilibrium
where censors elect to close their channels entirely. Next, we
show that a circumventor interested in maintaining communi-
cations over a longer, uncertain time horizon, will behave dif-
ferently, leading to a different equilibrium from the one present
in the single-round game.
2 Note that the analysis is invariant under affine transformations of the
players’ utility functions.
4.2 Step 2: Multiple Rounds, No
Apparatus
As in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Nash equilibrium in the sim-
ple censorship game described above arises from not modeling
the temporal dynamics of the game. Intuitively, if both censor
and circumventor know that exactly one round of the game
will be played, there is no reason for the circumventor to hold
back: they will always send the largest possible amount of traf-
fic, and if the censor doesn’t block, the circumventor gets as
much reward as possible. If the censor does block, then the cir-
cumventor would not get any reward regardless of what they
played. In the face of such an opponent, the censor of course
must block (contingent on F and CTPmax), to avoid the un-
acceptable volume of circumvention traffic that would be sent.
The key result for cooperation in temporal games, due to
Aumann [4], is that the equilibrium that follows if the play-
ers know when the game will end is often identical to that
in a single-shot game. This is because, in the last round of
the game, the players are simply playing the static game again
(there is no temporal component, because the game will now
end, just like in Step 1 above). Once the players know how
the final round will be played, then they can also infer how
the penultimate round should be played inductively, treating
the game as ending one round earlier than before, with full
knowledge of the outcomes in the final round that will follow.
Inductively, the players will play the first round in the same
fashion as they would the last, if the game requires coordi-
nation. Since the censorship game we study can be modeled
with such a coordination-based element (if the censor opens
the channel, they “trust” the circumventor to behave rationally
and not to defect and send too much traffic), it is straightfor-
ward to show by backward induction that the equilibrium of a
temporal version of the game with a fixed number of rounds
will be exactly the same as the equilibrium in the single shot
game. However, when the game is played for an infinite or in-
definite number of rounds, then this need not be so.
Suppose that after each round of the game, another round
is played with probability p, and otherwise the players stop.
This can model scenarios where the CRS or communication
technology has become deprecated, or because the conditions
of censorship have changed. A strategy in the context of this
extensive-form game (i.e. the game of playing many rounds of
the censorship game described in Step 1) consists of specifying
a policy for how a player plays, in light of everything their
opponent has done in the past.
We analyze this game using the same utility function from
Step 1, summed across all rounds of play. Formally, we de-
note by Ucen(t) and Ucir(t) the respective utilities gained by
the censor and circumventor during timestep t. If the game is
still proceeding (recall the game ends with probability p af-
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ter each round) then these utilities are simply the utilities each
player derives from a single round of the game, as in the previ-
ous subsection. Otherwise, both are zero. The censor’s goal is
then to maximize
∑∞
t=0 Ucir(t), with a corresponding goal for
the circumventor. Again we assume that the δ and γbct param-
eters are zero due to typical CRS designs not being concerned
with the fallout of CRS activity and discount the blocked CRS
traffic.
As this is a multi-round game, a player’s strategy is a spec-
ification of how they would play in this round, given every pos-
sible sequence of preceding rounds of play. In practice, many
strategies can be specified that operate on the basis of a finite
history.
4.2.1 Analysis
An interesting Nash equilibrium emerges where circumventor
and censor are both involved in a repeated game.
Theorem 2. For Z = (1 − p)CTPmax, if F ≥ Z, there ex-
ists a Nash equilibrium where the censor’s strategy is “On”
as long as the circumventor has never played CTP > Z at
any point in the past, and to play “Off” if even one prior it-
eration of the game involved the circumventor sending more
traffic than that, and the circumventor adopts a policy of play-
ing CTP = Z at every step.
Proof. To show that the censor leaving the channel open and
the circumventor playing CTP = Z is a Nash equilibrium we
use a proof by construction.
Suppose that both players start in the supposed equilib-
rium state (where the censor plays strategy scen, and the cir-
cumventor plays strategy scir). If the circumventor has com-
mitted to playing Z, then the censor receives at least as much
utility for keeping the channel open in each round as for clos-
ing it (by definition of F above). Therefore, the censor cannot
improve its utility by closing the channel if the circumven-
tor adopts scir . Any strategy that contains one or more closed
rounds is less profitable than one containing all open rounds.
If the censor has adopted scen, then (provided γact is pos-
itive, and γbct, δact and δbct are zero), the circumventor can-
not improve its utility by sending less traffic than Z per round,
since the censor will keep the channels open either way. There-
fore we need only consider strategies where the circumventor
sends more than Z traffic at some point. If it sends more traf-
fic than Z, it receives γactCTPmax utility in this round, but
is certain to receive no traffic in subsequent rounds, since the
censor has committed to playing scen.
Suppose the circumventor adopts a strategy of playing Z
for some number of rounds k, after which it deviates and plays
CTPmax for one round. Note that if the circumventor plays
less than CTPmax in the deviation round, it can derive strictly
greater utility by playing CTPmax during the deviation round
instead. We will show by induction that there are no profitable
deviation rounds for the circumventor to select.
For the base case, suppose k = 0, so the circumventor
will deviate in the first round of play. A deviation here earns a
total of γactCTPmax utility for the entirety of the game, since
no utility can be earned during any subsequent round. In con-
trast, the circumventor earns an expected γact
∑∞
i=0 p
iZ =
γact
1
1−pZ = γactCTPmax for playing Z in every round.
Therefore the circumventor gains no utility in expectation for
deviating in the first round.
For the inductive step, suppose that there are no prof-
itable deviations for time steps less than k. The circumven-
tor earns an expected γact
∑k−1
i=0 p
iZ = γact 1−p
k
1−p Z = (1 −
pk)γactCTPmax from the first k−1 timesteps, and then earns
pkγactCTPmax for deviating in the kth round, for a total of
γactCTPmax. This is exactly the amount earned by not devi-
ating, so no profitable deviations exist in round k either.
Note that if the circumventor plays a value greater than F , the
censor will be better off keeping the channel closed, and if they
play a value less than Z = (1 − p)CTPmax then the circum-
ventor would prefer to play Z in the first round. Any value be-
tween these two however, is an equilibrium. Either party can
set the exact level used by making a public declaration that
they will play a strategy in this set, to which the best response
of their opponent is to play the complementary strategy.
The equilibrium just outlined depends on the assumption
that the censor turns off the channel and never turns it back on
if the traffic sent exceeds Z. However, this may not be a cred-
ible threat since the censor wants the channel open in the long
run, so as to allow the non-circumvention traffic to get through.
Furthermore, if the circumventor drops the circumvention traf-
fic proportion, i.e. CTP < Z , after sending CTPmax, the
censor cannot plausibly commit to keeping the channel closed
forever in response since it is now better to open the channel,
as we have shown earlier. To resolve this shortcoming of the
original model, we can refine the model by having the censor
instead commit to blocking the channel for a period of finite
length, τ . This blocking period can also be thought of as the
punishment the censor metes out to the circumventor for de-
fecting. To find τ , the censor simply repeats the same analysis
as for the infinite punishment period, but with a slight modifi-
cation, which we detail next.
In the first round, the circumventor could again deviate
and send up to CTP = CTPmax traffic. After this, the censor
would close the channel for τ rounds, resulting in a total util-
ity for the circumventor of γactCTPmax for τ + 1 rounds. In
contrast, leaving the channel open for that period would pro-
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vide a total utility of Ucir = γact
∑τ
i=0 p
iZ = γactZ 1−p
τ
1−p
to the circumventor. After the period of τ + 1 rounds has
passed, the game will be in the same state as at the start
(i.e., the censor will open the channel, and the circumven-
tor will set their circumvention traffic proportion to what-
ever value will maximize profits). An equilibrium where the
censor keeps the channel open, and the circumventor sends
Z = CTP = 1−p1−pτ CTPmax traffic then follows by similar
logic to the equilibrium with an infinite punishment period,
provided that F > Z. Note that, as τ is increased, the value Z
that the censor can use will decrease, but with rapidly dimin-
ishing returns. The precise value selected by the censor will
thus depend on how credible the censor’s threats are. A censor
that can credibly claim that it will close the channel for longer
periods will be able to squeeze the circumvention traffic pro-
portion lower than one that cannot credibly make such threats.
Both equilibria discussed so far are plausible in the real
world. Censors might indeed decide to permanently shut a
channel over which too much undesired traffic has been seen
to flow even once. Certainly it is plausible that censors might
choose to temporarily close the channel for some prolonged,
but finite, period in response. Yet, although these strategies are
part of valid Nash equilibria, there are not the strategies that ra-
tional actors, as opposed to the real-world actors, would adopt
when playing a repeated game since they are not subgame per-
fect equilibria. A subgame perfect equilibrium requires that
strategies be locally rational. That is, starting from any point in
the game, players cannot do better than continuing to play the
strategies prescribed by the equilibrium. This is clearly not the
behavior we observe when the censor engages in punishment.
For example, if we start the game immediately after the cir-
cumventor has sent a large burst of traffic, then if the circum-
ventor has committed to playing Z from now on, a rational
censor could (locally) improve its utility by ceasing punish-
ment and reopening the channel immediately. In short, there
is little incentive for the censor to actually follow through its
threat of long-term punishment when closing the channel hurts
the censor too.
4.2.2 Perfect Nash Folk Theorem
Although real-world actors may indeed follow through with
such seemingly irrational threats (perhaps because of exter-
nal factors, like a need to maintain prestige in other, simulta-
neously played, games) the “perfect” Nash Folk Theorem of
Fudenberg and Maskin [17] provides a more complex equilib-
rium that is of similar form, yet is also subgame perfect (i.e.,
players cannot do better than following through on the threats
they make). For the purpose of this analysis, the perfect Nash
folk theorem states that, provided players are able to random-
ize their strategies (e.g., commit to strategies where closing the
channel occurs say, with probability 0.5), then for any given
convex combination of the payoffs players could receive at
different points in the parametric family of strategy profiles ∗,
there exists a set of “supporting” profiles such that playing the
strategies prescribed by ∗ is a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium for all players, provided p (the probability of playing one
more round of the game) is large enough. Below, we construct
the three profiles needed to support the equilibrium produced
in the earlier analysis, and specify the transitions needed be-
tween them to “support” the desired equilibrium in the context
of the repeated censorship game. Our contribution here is con-
struction of the equilibrium, using the approaches outlined by
Fudenberg and Maskin [17], and the reader should refer to that
work for further details.
The four profiles are presented in tabular form in Table 1.
The full strategy for each player (they are symmetric) is as
follows:
1. If this is the first round, or the opponent has only ever
played the action specified for them in ∗, play the action
specified for this player in ∗.
2. Otherwise, if both players played the actions specified by
rcen in the previous round, then this player should play
the action specified by rcen in the next round.
3. Otherwise, if both players played the actions specified by
rcir in the previous round, then this player should play the
action specified by rcir in the next round.
4. Otherwise, if both players played the actions specified by
∗ in fewer than the last τ rounds, then this player should
play the action specified by ∗ in the next round.
5. If both players have played the actions specified by ∗ for
the last τ rounds, then this player should play the action
specified by rcen in the next round if the censor did not
play according to steps 1–4 during the round τ + 1 ago,
and rcir otherwise.
Theorem 3. The above strategy profile is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, provided that σ ≥ 1 and that  > 0, as well
as that F ≥ Z and Z1−p > Z−1−p − Z−1−pσ+1 > CTPmax1−pτ+1 and
thatCTPmax > F . (i.e., that both players prefer receiving the
long-term payoffs incurred in ∗ to either r states, and prefer
the longterm payoff of either r states to the payoff of repeatedly
deviating and being punished in state ∗).
Proof. To show that the proposed strategies are a subgame
perfect Nash Equilibrium, we need only show that unilaterally
deviating in any one state of the game for a single step, and
then returning to the equilibrium strategies, can only produce
long-term harm for the player that deviates, and never long-
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Table 1. The four phases of the subgame perfect equilibrium
strategies for the repeated version of the censorship game. The
variables σ and  are parameters, and are set as explained in the
text.
Name Xcen CTP
∗ 1 (open) Z
rcen 1 (open) for σ rounds,
then 0 (closed) for one
round
Z for σ rounds, then
CTPmax for one
round
rcir 1 (open) for σ rounds,
then 0 (closed) for one
round
Z −  for σ rounds,
then CTPmax for one
round
∗ 0 (closed) CTPmax
term benefits. This follows from Blackwell’s one-shot devia-
tion principle [5].
We start by considering the phase ∗. In this phase, a sin-
gle deviation by the censor after k rounds will yield zero util-
ity for the round of deviation (since closing the channel means
no traffic gets through at all), followed by τ rounds of zero
utility punishments, followed by an endgame spent in rcen.
Payouts prior to the deviation are identical whether the cen-
sor deviates or not at step k, and so need not be considered.
Since F > Z, we know the censor receives a positive util-
ity q in each step of ∗, and that not deviating would pay out
an expected amount pk(
∑∞
i=0 p
iq) = p
kq
1−p . Deviating pro-
duces total earnings of pk(
∑τ+1
i=0 p
i0) = 0 for the devia-
tion and punishment phases, followed by pk(
∑∞
i=τ+2 p
iq −∑∞
i=τ+2 p
(σ+1)iq) = pk(p
τ+2
1−p q − p
τ+σ+3)
1−p q. A single step
deviation is not profitable for the censor in ∗. During the pun-
ishment phase ∗, if the censor deviates (opening the channel)
for one timestep after k steps, it receives negative utility (since
CTPmax
1−pτ > F ). After this, it receives 0 utility for τ rounds,
followed by pk(p
τ+2
1−p q− p
τ+σ+3
1−p q) in the endgame. If the cen-
sor had not deviated from the punishment phase, it would have
spent at most τ more rounds there, followed by receiving at
least pk(p
τ+1
1−p q − p
τ+σ+2
1−p q) during the end game (more if the
circumventor was being punished). Therefore, the censor does
not benefit from a single step deviation during the punishment
phase.
During the rcir phase, the censor receives
q
1−p − p
σ+1
1−p q
for not deviating. There are two possible deviations: closing
the channel during one of the σ rounds when it should be
open, or opening it during round σ + 1. If the censor closes
the channel after k rounds of playing the correct strategy, dur-
ing one of the σ rounds, it earns 0 utility for that round, fol-
lowed by 0 utility for τ rounds of punishment, followed by
pτ+1+k
1−p q − p
k+τ+σ+2
1−p q utility in the long run. In contrast, it
could have earned a non-zero amount in the deviation round,
at least 0 during each punishment round, and then the same
endgame amount. Opening the channel during the σ+1 round
produces negative utility for that round (since CTPmax1−pτ > F ,
and the analysis is otherwise identical, yielding net negative
utility in that case also. Therefore, the censor does not benefit
from a single step deviation during the rcir phase. The analy-
sis for the rcen phase follows an identical argument, but with a
slightly different (slightly larger) value of q. There is no bene-
ficial single step deviation in that phase either. Therefore, there
are no beneficial single step deviations for the censor.
For the circumventor, not deviating after k steps during
∗ pays pk∑∞i=0 piZ = pk Z1−p . Deviating will pay an initial
pkCTPmax, followed byτ rounds of zero utility, followed by
an endgame spent in rcir paying a total of pk+τ+1(Z−1−p −
pσ+1(Z−)
1−pσ+1 ). Since we have assumed a p large enough that
(1−pτ+1)Z
1−p > CTPmax, and Z > Z − , more total utility
is earned by not deviating. Therefore, there is no profitable
single-step deviation for either player from the ∗ state. An
identical argument can be used to show no profitable single-
step deviations exist from the rcir and rcen steps (note that
there is no special case here because deviating during the σ+1
step of that phase has no effect for the circumventor).
All that remains is to show that no profitable single step
deviations exist for the circumventor from the punishment
phase. Not deviating after k rounds of punishment results in at
most τ more rounds of punishment, followed by an endgame
in rcir, earning pk+τ (Z−1−p − p
σ+1(Z−)
1−pσ+1 ). Deviating results
in τ more rounds of punishment, and earns no additional util-
ity during deviation (since the censor is still playing closed).
The endgame is the same, with pk+τ+1(Z−1−p − p
σ+1(Z−)
1−pσ+1 ) in
earnings. Since not deviating yields at most τ more rounds, it
can be better, and is certainly no worse. Therefore there is no
profitable single step deviation for the circumventor.
Interestingly, we note that p could be replaced by any dis-
counting factor for the utility of future rewards, so long as the
game remains infinite. So if, instead of representing the chance
of a future game, p represented the preference of each party
for rewards today as opposed to in the future, a similar result
could be derived. In practice, most companies do use such a
discounting factor when considering the benefits of future re-
wards, since events in the future are fundamentally uncertain.
To provide a censorship resistance example: a whistleblower
may use a discounting factor where they are uncertain about
their ability to communicate in the future and the value of the
information they wish to transmit may be of such high impact
that maintaining the channel for future use may be ignored.
We can conclude from this analysis that it is a reasonable
policy for the circumventor interested in maintaining a long-
term communication channel to keep CTP ≤ F , with the ex-
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act value dependent on the utility functions of the two players,
and the credibility of threats made by the censor.
4.3 Step 3: Multiple Rounds, With an
Apparatus
We now consider the case where the censor has some appara-
tus capable of distinguishing the target, covert, traffic (CTP)
from the non-circumvention cover traffic (L). The apparatus
correctly labels a fraction TPR (the true positive rate) of the
circumvention traffic, but also incorrectly labels a fraction
FPR (the false positive rate) of the non-circumvention traf-
fic as circumvention traffic. Similarly, traffic not positively la-
beled can be partitioned to that which is truly not circumven-
tion traffic, i.e. TNR (true negatives), and that which has been
missed by the apparatus, i.e. FNR (false negatives). We note
that FNR = 1−TPR andTNR = 1−FPR. The output of the
apparatus is traffic with the “Positive” tag or “Negative” tag,
referring to if the apparatus deems the traffic as being CRS-
related or not, respectively.
The new action space of the censor has two variables, de-
noted Xp and Xn, where both can take the values 0 and 1
(Block and Allow). Xp governs traffic tagged “Postive” and
the censor can either block or allow this traffic. Similarly, Xn
governs traffic tagged “Negative” and the censor can again ei-
ther block or allow the traffic. The action space of the circum-
ventor remains unchanged from before.
The presence of the apparatus serves to alter the utility
functions of the censor and circumventor, U ′cen and U ′cir re-
spectively, as follows:
U ′cen =CTP(−αact(TPR ·Xp + FNR ·Xn)+
αbct(TPR(1−Xp) + FNR(1−Xn)))+
(1− CTP)(βant(FPR ·Xp + TNR ·Xn)−
βbnt(FPR(1−Xp) + TNR(1−Xn)))
(4)
U ′cir = CTP(γact(TPR ·Xp + FNR ·Xn)) (5)
The parameters are all normalized as before to the range
[0, 1]. To help build intuition, as an example let us con-
sider the censor’s sensitivity to blocking circumvention traf-
fic (αbct). Its contribution to the censor’s utility function is
CTP ·αbct(TPR(1−Xp) +FNR(1−Xn)) because a frac-
tion CTP of the traffic is circumvention traffic, and of that,
TPR of it is reported as positive, which will get blocked if
Xp = 0, and FNR = 1 − TPR of it is reported as negative,
which will get blocked if Xn = 0. Similar reasoning follows
for the other parameters.
4.3.1 Analysis
Ultimately the dynamics of this game are similar to those in
Step 1 or 2 (depending on whether we incorporate temporal
dynamics or not), with adjustments to the parameters of the
censor. First, we analyze the censor’s strategy space and make
the following observations.
The censor has four strategies to play. Strategy
(Xp, Xn) = (1, 1) is the same as not having an apparatus
since the censor ignores the “Positive” tag on traffic and allows
it through as well as allowing all the traffic with the “Negative”
tag.
Strategy (Xp, Xn) = (0, 0) is again the same as not hav-
ing an apparatus and is also the same as blocking all traffic
since the censor disagrees with traffic tagged “Negative” and
blocks it as well as blocking all the traffic tagged “Positive”.
Strategy (Xp, Xn) = (0, 1) is where the censor goes
along with the tagging of the apparatus and blocks traffic la-
beled “Positive” and allows traffic labeled “Negative”.
Strategy (Xp, Xn) = (1, 0) implies that it is always bet-
ter for the censor to disagree with the apparatus completely
and do the opposite of what its tagging suggests. So now, traf-
fic labeled “Positive” is allowed through while traffic labeled
“Negative” is blocked. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that should the censor find that disagreement is more benefi-
cial then it simply switches the tags which makes this strategy
equivalent to strategy (0, 1) above. This is the same as assum-
ing that TPR ≥ FPR and, equivalently, that TNR ≥ FNR.
We now consider these strategies in more detail. Setting
(Xp, Xn) = (1, 1) in Equation 4 gives the following:
U ′cen(1,1) =CTP(−αact) + (1− CTP)(βant) (6)
Similarly, the other settings yield the following utility
equations:
U ′cen(0,0) =CTP(αbct) + (1− CTP)(−βbnt) (7)
U ′cen(0,1) =CTP(−αact · FNR + αbct · TPR)+
(1− CTP)(βant · TNR − βbnt · FPR)
(8)
To discover when it is better to play each strategy we com-
pare each one against the other. Since the censor’s utility de-
pends on the circumvention traffic we state the results of this
comparison in terms of CTP .
For the censor to choose (1, 1) over (0, 0) then
U ′
cen(1,1)
≥ U ′
cen(0,0)
and the following must hold:
CTP ≤ βant + βbnt
αact + αbct + βant + βbnt
, (9)
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or CTP ≤ Fab, where Fab = βant+βbntαact+αbct+βant+βbnt . The sub-
script ab denotes that when the inequality holds the censor gets
more utility by allowing all traffic through than by blocking it.
Note that F ≡ Fab.
For the censor to choose (1, 1) over (0, 1) then
U ′
cen(1,1)
≥ U ′
cen(0,1)
and the following must also hold:
CTP ≤ FPR(βant + βbnt)TPR(αact + αbct) + FPR(βant + βbnt) , (10)
orCTP ≤ Fam, whereFam = FPR(βant+βbnt)TPR(αact+αbct)+FPR(βant+βbnt) .
Similar to the convention used above, the subscript am de-
notes that when the inequality holds the censor gets more
utility by allowing all traffic than by using the apparatus (the
m stands for machine, since the apparatus is a kind of ma-
chine).
For the censor to choose (0, 1) over (0, 0) means that
U ′
cen(0,1)
> U ′
cen(0,0)
. Therefore the following must also hold:
CTP ≤ TNR(βant + βbnt)FNR(αact + αbct) + TNR(βant + βbnt) , (11)
orCTP ≤ Fmb, whereFmb = TNR(βant+βbnt)FNR(αact+αbct)+TNR(βant+βbnt) .
Again similar to before, the subscript mb denotes that when
the inequality holds the censor gets more utility by using the
apparatus than by blocking all traffic.
Each of Fab, Fam, and Fmb is a threshold on CTP that
drives the censor’s decision to allow, block, or use the appara-
tus. We would like to discover the ordering between the thresh-
olds so that the censor can make informed (strategic) choices.
We make an observation that simplifies the analysis: the terms
αact+αbct and βant+βbnt are common and can be replaced
with α and β, respectively. When determining the relative or-
dering of the three thresholds, we will assume, as above, that
TPR ≥ FPR (and equivalently, that TNR ≥ FNR).
We begin by noting that Fab ≥ Fam ⇔ FPR ≤ TPR
since:
Fab ≥ Fam
⇔ β
α+ β ≥
FPR · β
TPR · α+ FPR · β
⇔ α+ β
β
≤ TPR · α+ FPR · βFPR · β
⇔ α
β
≤ TPR · αFPR · β
⇔ FPR ≤ TPR
(12)
0 1BR’ Fam Fab Fmb
allow apparatus apparatus block
Fig. 1. Best censor strategies at critical circumvention traffic
thresholds. The censor’s strategies are in italics. The circumven-
tor’s strategies are to send a proportion of circumvention traffic,
0 ≤ CTP ≤ 1, with the critical thresholds marked as Fam, Fab,
and Fmb.
Similarly, we also note that Fmb ≥ Fab ⇔ FNR ≤ TNR
since:
Fmb ≥ Fab
⇔ TNR · βFNR · α+ TNR · β ≥
β
α+ β
⇔ FNR · α+ TNR · βTNR · β ≤
α+ β
β
⇔ FNR · αTNR · β ≤
α
β
⇔ FNR ≤ TNR
(13)
Since Fmb ≥ Fab and Fab ≥ Fam, it is clear that the total
ordering is Fmb ≥ Fab ≥ Fam.
Given this ordering, the censor will play according to the
following strategies, which are depicted in Figure 1. When
CTP ≤ Fam the censor will allow all traffic to flow. When
Fam ≤ CTP ≤ Fab or Fab ≤ CTP ≤ Fmb then the cen-
sor will use the apparatus rather than allowing or blocking all
the traffic, respectively. Indeed, as long as the apparatus does
better than a coin toss then the Fab threshold does not matter,
reducing the preceding to Fam ≤ CTP ≤ Fmb. Finally, when
CTP > Fmb the censor should block all traffic.
Turning to the circumventor we see that she actually
only has two reasonable choices: sending CTP = Fam (in
which case all of her circumvention traffic will get through),
or CTP = Fmb (in which case only a fraction FNR of her
circumvention traffic will get through). The decision rests on
whether FNR · Fmb ≥ Fam; i.e., when the inequality holds,
the circumventor should send CTP = Fmb circumvention
traffic, and otherwise she should send CTP = Fam.
The key takeaway from the analysis in this section is that
neither party has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
points, as defined by the circumvention traffic thresholds Fam,
Fab, and Fmb. That is to say that as long as the circumventor
does not send more than Fmb traffic, the censor will not block
it, but will apply its apparatus to reduce the amount of cir-
cumvention traffic that gets through, or allow it entirely if it is
below Fam.
It is clear then that the introduction of the apparatus, with
its inherent TPR and FPR, does not produce a deviation from
the character of the Nash equilibrium that we found in the sim-
pler cases 1 and 2. This is because the only effect is to modify
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the parameters of the players’ utility functions, and the results
from those two cases hold for a specified range of parameter-
izations. The main effect is on the fraction of the total traffic,
CTP, the circumventor can send through while ensuring that
the inequalities above remain true.
5 Extensions and Analysis
So far, we have analyzed a simple model where the circumven-
tion system 1) utilizes only a single protocol and 2) the CRS’s
mechanism to ensure the amount of circumvention traffic re-
mains below the critical threshold is immune from the censor’s
influence.
Also, we considered a linear function for censor utility but
it might be the case that the censor’s stakes (costs) to block-
ing CRS traffic, and not making mistakes, ramp up faster as
rates of errors increase making the censor more risk averse
than the linear model above describes. This is reasonable to
assume since the use of the Internet is expected to be unhin-
dered, and after a certain amount of blocked traffic (i.e. reduc-
tion in functionality) it quickly becomes apparent that some-
thing is wrong which may trigger an escalating wave of user
unrest, for instance. One way to capture this is to utilize an ex-
ponential utility function for the censor, such as the following
example:
U ′′cen = e−(C·FPR·(1−CTP)+D·FNR·CTP)) (14)
U ′′cir = E · FNR · CTP (15)
Similar to the earlier α and β, the non-negative param-
eters C and D control the sensitivity of the censor to false
positives and false negatives respectively. Like γ before, the
non-negative parameter E controls the circumventor’s sensi-
tivity to circumvention traffic getting through the censor’s SoI;
without loss of generality, E = 1 for the remainder of this
discussion. As before, the variable FNR is the percentage of
the circumvention traffic that gets through (i.e., the false nega-
tives) and FPR is the percentage of non-circumvention traffic
blocked (i.e., the false positives). This function allows a wide
range of plausible censor utility functions to be modeled, and
results in utility values between 0 (maximum dissatisfaction)
and 1 (maximum satisfaction).
In subsection 5.1 we perform a closed-form analysis to
investigate the relaxation of the condition of using only one
protocol and to explore the effect of multiple protocols on the
equilibrium solutions. In section 6 we relax the other condition
as well, and examine the case when the CRS’s CTP control
mechanism is open to the censor’s influence. Unfortunately, a
closed-form style of analysis becomes more complex in this
scenario and less straightforward to reason about. Therefore,
we introduce a numerical analysis tool (or numerical analyzer)
to assist in solution finding and to gain further insights, the
details of which can be found in Appendix A.
Censor types. The results of any particular analysis de-
pend on the type of the censor; i.e., the particular values of
C and D. Solving Equation 14 to find the threshold amount
of circumvention traffic gives CC+D , which we denote by Fab
using the same notation as before. Hence, we can describe cen-
sor types by the value Fab. Values less than 0.5 denote a cen-
sor who is more averse to information leakage than collateral
damage, while values higher than 0.5 denote a censor who is
more averse to collateral damage than information leakage. At
the lower extreme no amount of circumvention traffic will be
tolerated, while at the higher extreme an unbounded amount
of circumvention traffic will be tolerated.
5.1 Moving from one to multiple
protocols
The aim of the analysis that follows is to explore how to iden-
tify cover protocols that are good candidates as cover traffic for
the amount of circumvention traffic that we wish to send. We
focus on the quantity of the cover traffic a protocol provides
rather than its other qualities such as the ease with which it
can be imitated or the system deployed.
5.1.1 Single protocol
Our analysis so far shows that for a given censor there exists
a circumvention traffic threshold Fab below which a rational
censor will not block the communication channel. Since, for
any given censor, this threshold is fixed and proportional to
the size of L, the only way to achieve more throughput for
circumvention traffic is to utilize another channel with a higher
amount of cover traffic L.
In this simple scenario, the circumventor who can only
target one protocol should pick the protocol with the largest
L that they can successfully imitate. However, it might be the
case that there is no single protocol with a sufficiently high
amount of cover traffic to meet the CRS users’ throughput de-
mands, and so simultaneously utilizing multiple protocols is
the natural next step.
5.1.2 Two or more protocols
Each cover protocol i ∈ {1, . . . , n} provides an amount of
non-circumvention traffic Li that is some portion of the total
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non-circumvention traffic L. We order the protocols so that
the amount of non-circumvention traffic across the protocols
is 〈L1, . . . , Ln〉 in descending order. Also, there is an amount
of circumvention trafficCTPi imitating protocol i that is some
portion of the total circumvention traffic CTP . We denote by
Ri = CTPi + Li the total amount of traffic over protocol i.
The total amount of traffic on the network is then
∑n
i=1(Li +
CTPi) = L+ CTP = 1.
Theorem 4. If CTP ≤ Fab, the optimal distribution of traffic
over many real protocols is to allocate CTPi = Li · CTP1−CTP
over protocols 1, . . . , n. If CTP > Fab, it is to allocate
CTPi = Li · Fab1−Fab over protocols 1, . . . , n and then to addi-
tionally allocate, or dump, any remaining, surplus, traffic over
protocol n, which will be blocked.
Proof sketch. From section 5.1.1, we make the observation
that the censor will only block a protocol i if and only if
CTPi
CTPi+Li > Fab. In the first case, where CTP ≤ Fab, setting
CTPi = Li · CTP1−CTP means that CTPiCTPi+Li = CTP ≤ Fab,
so none of the protocols will be blocked, and the circumventor
will have maximum utility.
In the second case, where CTP > Fab, setting CTPi =
Li · Fab1−Fab means that
CTPi
CTPi+Li = Fab, so at this point, none
of the protocols will be blocked (they are each right at the edge
of what the censor will tolerate), but there is still Fab − CTP
circumvention traffic to allocate to some protocol.
Trying to send this surplus traffic over any protocol will
cause that protocol to be blocked, and the circumventor will
lose the utility associated with the circumvention traffic sent
over that protocol. Since the amount of circumvention traffic
CTPi over each protocol is proportional to the amount of non-
curcumvention traffic Li , the circumventor’s best strategy is to
use protocol n, which has the smallest amount of both kinds
of traffic.
Unilateral deviation from this equilibrium point produces
less utility for the players; for instance crossing the threshold
on one protocol while underutilizing another to compensate
produces suboptimal utility.
An implication of the above is that we can treat the usage
of individual protocols independently from each other, mean-
ing that there are no further constraints to picking protocols
other than to maximize the amount of cover traffic, and thus
the amount of circumvention traffic.
5.1.3 Dumping vs. throttling
We consider the situation where instead of dumping the sur-
plus traffic on protocol n and letting the censor block it, we
simply elect to not send it, effectively throttling the CRS to
ensure CTP ≤ Fab. We can model this situation as a spe-
cial case of the above theorem—with the proof intact—by
adding an additional pseudo protocol n + 1 where Li = 0.
The same optimal traffic allocation strategy applies in this
case as above (i.e., the surplus is sent over the last protocol,
n+1), except now we obtain greater circumventor utility, since
CTP > CTP[1 ,...,n−1 ]. Hence, it is always better to throttle
rather than to dump.
6 The interfering censor
In the preceding analysis the CTP can be throttled by the
CRS’s idealized CTP control mechanism to remain below the
censor’s blocking threshold. We have thus far assumed that
this ideal mechanism remains outside the censor’s influence.
We now relax this assumption and describe a traffic flooding
attack the censor could mount on the control mechanism.
6.1 Flooding attack
The censor will inject fake circumvention traffic, CTPfake
into the pool of real circumvention traffic CTPreal , such that
CTPreal + CTPfake = CTPR+F . Since the CRS cannot tell
the difference between real CRS traffic and that of the cen-
sor, the censor can inject an arbitrary amount of traffic into
the CRS network, and thus inflate CTPR+F at will. We also
assume that throughout the attack CTPreal remains constant.
The objective of throttling is to ensure that CTPR+F =
Fab gets through and to ignore sending the remaining traffic.
However, when the censor is injecting fake traffic, the open
protocols are only transmitting a fraction CTPrealCTPreal+CTPfake of
CTPreal . The remaining traffic getting through will be the cir-
cumventor’s fake traffic. As the ratio CTPfake : CTPreal
increases, less and less real circumvention traffic will get
through, thus increasing the censor’s utility. Since the CRS en-
sures that CTPR+F traffic on each protocol will be less than
CTPi , the censor does not have to block any protocols, and
incurs no collateral damage to mounting this attack. A key fea-
ture of this attack is that it causes the eviction of real circum-
vention traffic from open protocols to the throttling “protocol”.
Dumping is equally susceptible to this attack, and with the
same level of effectiveness. Since there is no additional cost to
the censor, in terms of lost non-circumvention traffic, it can
increase CTPfake and drive CTPreal downwards by causing
the eviction of real CRS traffic to the dumping protocol. From
the perspective of the circumventor, it is worse to dump than to
throttle since when dumping she also loses protocol n, which
can carry some additional CTPreal .
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If the cost to the censor for using the CRS client and send-
ing traffic over it is zero, then the censor can drive CTPreal
down to zero with impunity. If the cost is not zero, then the
censor needs to insure that the sum of the utility gained (by
evicting real CRS traffic to the throttling or dumping proto-
cols) is greater than the cost of the fake CRS traffic required to
evict that quantity of real CRS traffic.
6.2 Alternative mechanisms
The flooding attack leverages a key feature of the throttling
and dumping mechanisms—that they ensure that only at most
one protocol will get blocked, even with censor manipulation.
The CRS protecting protocols from being blocked is the lynch-
pin of the attack. Looking back at section 5.1.2, we know that
the optimal solution is to allocate traffic in a monotonically
decreasing fashion over the protocols, with the last protocol
allowed to break that trend. We now consider a similar traf-
fic allocation mechanism with the additional constraint that it
be strictly monotonic across all protocols. This means that we
exclude any traffic distribution where the non-circumvention
traffic allocated over protocol a is greater than that allocated
over protocol b when the quantity of non-circumvention traf-
fic going over protocol b is greater than that of a. The effect
of the strict monotonicity is that no protocol will be protected
from blocking. Like before, the optimal censor strategy is still
to block a protocol if and only if CTPi > Ri · Fab.
We will first analyze strictly monotonic solutions and the
nature of their traffic allocation strategy, in terms of utility,
before we return to how robust they are to the flooding attack
in section 6.2.3. As noted earlier, we manage the complexity
of computation using the numerical analyzer we describe in
Appendix A.
6.2.1 The life monotonic
SinceCTP > Fab and because the CRS is no longer throttling
the CTP , in the remainder of this section, CTP will denote
the circumvention traffic proportion generated by the users of
the system, and not how much traffic the censor will allow
through.
To analyze this scenario we use our numerical analyzer
to identify optimal strategies in this setting. We increase the
amount of circumvention traffic, due to the CRS userbase,
above Fab in increments of 5% and analyze the resulting best
strategies for a censor where Fab = 0.5.3
3 Results are similar for other values of Fab.
Table 2. Optimal circumvention traffic (no flooding attack) distri-
bution for censor type Fab = 0.5, where CTP > Fab for various
values, Scir is the circumventor’s strategy (as percentages of
CTP over the six protocols), Scen is the censor’s strategy (A and
B denote an allowed or blocked ith protocol respectively), Ucen
is the censor’s utility, Ucir is the circumventor’s utility, and RUcir
is the circumventor’s utility relative to the Fab case. For example,
0.79 · 1.10 = 0.869.
CTP Scir Scen Ucen Ucir RUcir
Fab 53,25,9,7,4,4 AAAAAA 0.61 1.00 1.00
Fab · 1.05 48,23,16,5,4,4 AABAAA 0.63 0.84 0.88
Fab · 1.10 46,22,21,5,3,3 AABAAA 0.65 0.79 0.87
Fab · 1.15 43,21,21,9,3,3 AABBAA 0.66 0.70 0.81
Fab · 1.20 41,20,20,13,3,3 AABBAA 0.67 0.67 0.80
Fab · 1.50 25,25,25,21,2,2 ABBBAA 0.78 0.29 0.44
The results are presented in Table 2 and show that even
with 50% more circumvention traffic than allowed, it is still
possible to get a relative utility RUcir of∼ 44% (as compared
to the optimal when CTP ≤ Fab; e.g., when throttling).
We note in this scenario that none of the ratios for the
allowed protocols ever equals or exceeds Ri · Fab. This tells
us that the Fab threshold is an upper limit. Indeed, comparing
the utility relative to the Fab case (where Ucir = 1) in column
RUcir , we see that by increasing the amount of circumvention
traffic we get less utility than was possible by adhering to the
Fab threshold. This shows that strictly monotonic solutions are
less optimal than throttling solutions.
While it seems odd at first glance that circumventors
should send traffic over protocols they know to be blocked,
doing so actually preserves the equilibrium: if the censor were
to unblock one of the protocols, it is important that that action
would cause a decrease in the censor’s utility due to circum-
vention traffic suddenly beginning to flow. Had the circum-
ventor been sending dummy traffic instead, or stopped send-
ing traffic at all over that protocol, then—recalling that the cir-
cumventor’s actions are known to the censor—unblocking that
protocol would increase the censor’s utility by decreasing the
collateral damage caused by blocking non-circumvention traf-
fic.
6.2.2 Protocol ratio dependence
We now show that the ratios between the set of protocols plays
a significant role on the circumventor’s utility. We first inves-
tigate the two-protocol setting to identify the trends before an-
alyzing the six-protocol scenario.
Figure 2 illustrates the resultant utility of picking two
protocols with three different protocol ratios: R90,10 =
〈0.90, 0.10〉, R75,25 = 〈0.75, 0.25〉, and R51,49 =
〈0.51, 0.49〉. For low to moderately high surplus of CTP we
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Fig. 2. Circumventor utility at various CTP values over and be-
yond Fab for various cover protocol ratios.
note that protocol sets with ratio skew result in higher utility
than sets with ratio similarity. Indeed, the severely skewed pro-
tocol set R90,10 provides higher utility than the others. How-
ever, after a certain point,∼ Fab+40%, the situation is flipped
and the more even ratio protocol set provides higher utility
than the others. The reason for this is that when Fab is ex-
ceeded on a protocol, not only is the surplus circumvention
traffic blocked, but so is the circumvention traffic that could
have gotten through. In the skewed distribution there is a lot
of surplus-dumping potential in the smaller protocols with lit-
tle cost of dropping traffic that would otherwise have gone
through; this explains why they are better for smaller surplus
values than the more even protocol distributions. However, the
censor also benefits by this: there is less allowed traffic to harm
by blocking the protocol and as the surplus adds up the cost
gets further driven down. The sudden drop occurs because the
surplus is so great and the costs of blocking allowed traffic so
low that blocking the larger protocol becomes economically
feasible. It then becomes better to sacrifice the larger protocol
by sending all the surplus on it instead and saving the small
protocols to allow some traffic through.
Figure 2 also illustrates the utility of picking six pro-
tocols according to two different protocol ratios: the traffic-
volume ratios 〈0.51, 0.25, 0.09, 0.07, 0.04, 0.04〉 supplied by
the December 2015 Sandvine survey of North American In-
ternet traffic trends [32], and a very skewed R80,4... =
〈0.80, 0.04, 0.04, 0.04, 0.04, 0.04〉. We again see that the heav-
ily skewed protocol setR80,4... provides higher utility asCTP
increases past Fab, although the difference is not as drastic
as before. Compared to the two-protocol case the addition of
more protocols generally slows the decline in utility as the
CTP grows.
The above has implications for picking protocols to use
as cover traffic. Before, in subsubsection 5.1.2 where CTP ≤
Fab, protocols were independent and only the amount of cover
traffic was the criteria. Now, when CTP > Fab, we see that
we cannot simply try to maximize the cover traffic, but need
to be strategic in which set of protocols we pick.
However, one must keep in mind that the same set of pro-
tocols may have different ratios on one network as compared
to another. If this is not taken in to account it would likely
cause suboptimal utility as the wrong circumventor strategy is
played for that network. The implication for the CRS is that
strategies are on a per network (censor) level.
Related to this, one must also take into account the ex-
istence of other circumvention traffic due to other CRS sys-
tems on the chosen protocols, since the censor will evaluate
its utility globally on all the traffic. This is because the censor
is unable to tell circumvention traffic from non-circumvention
traffic, which implies they are also unable to tell apart circum-
vention traffic due to different CRS systems.
6.2.3 Attack mitigation and comparison
Let us now consider strict monotonic mechanism in the pres-
ence of the flooding attack. Note that we start from a stable
equilibrium where no protocols have already been blocked
since CTPreal = CTP = Fab. From this starting point we
will investigate the effect of various quantities of fake CRS
traffic (i.e., CTPR+F > Fab) on the equilibrium points of the
game and utilities of the two players.
In Table 2, where we previously considered the surplus as
coming from the CRS userbase, we can now consider the sur-
plus, or CTPfake, as the consequence of the flooding attack.
Using the data in the table we will re-calculate how much real
CRS traffic is actually blocked, or CTPreal_loss, in the pres-
ence of varying proportions of CTPfake and perform a cost-
benefit analysis.
Tables 3 and 4 provide the results of a cost-benefit analy-
sis of the censor mounting the flooding attack. For the analysis
we compute the utility gained through the reduction of real
CRS traffic, and the utility lost due to non-circumvention traf-
fic being blocked on protocols where the strictly monotonic
traffic allocation violated the Fab threshold.
The censor will only deploy the flooding attack if it
causes a gain in censor utility from blocked real CRS traffic
(CTPreal_loss) that outweighs the loss in censor utility from
blocked non-circumvention traffic (Lloss) caused by protocol
traffic violations. For the censor type with equilibrium point
Fab = 0.5, the ratio of CTPreal_loss : Lloss has to be 1 : 1,
or as a fraction CTPreal_lossCTPreal_loss+Lloss . For the flooding attack to be
cost-effective this fraction must exceed the equilibrium point;
i.e., CTPreal_lossCTPreal_loss+Lloss > Fab. The aim of this analysis is not to
find the maximum cost effectiveness of the attack, but when,
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Table 3. Cost-benefit analysis for censor deploying a flooding
attack on the monotonic mechanism. Here Fab = 0.5, using
the Sandvine protocol ratios, 〈0.51, 0.25, 0.09, 0.07, 0.04, 0.04〉,
where CTPreal_loss is the fraction of real CRS traffic blocked, and
Lloss is the fraction of non-circumvention traffic blocked. For an
economically sound flooding attack Cost eff. ≥ Fab = 0.5.
CTPR+F CTPreal_loss Lloss Cost eff.
Fab · 1.20 0.264 0.16 0.62
Fab · 1.50 0.355 0.41 0.46
Fab · 1.75 0.218 0.51 0.30
if ever, it is not cost effective for the censor to continue the at-
tack, since as long as the cost effectiveness is greater than Fab
the censor should continue the attack, even if it decreases the
cost effectiveness.
In Table 3, we use the Sandvine traffic-volume ratios. We
note that the flooding attack is economically sound until there
is approximately 50% fake traffic. At this point, the attack is
no longer viable. The same results hold for censor of other
types; i.e., other values of Fab.
In Table 4, we investigate the role of protocol ratio skew-
ness, and see that the attack is still self-limiting, however at a
much larger surplus value, about 80%. This leads us to believe
that a skewed protocol distribution allows the censor to extract
more utility from the flooding attack than is possible under a
less skewed protocol distribution, such as the linearly decreas-
ing Sandvine ratios. Again, the analysis for other censor types
also displays the same trends.
From our analysis it is apparent that under the strictly
monotonic mechanism the censor cannot evict a larger pro-
portion of real CRS traffic, as compared to the throttling and
dumping mechanisms. Therefore, while the monotonic alloca-
tion mechanism is susceptible to the flooding attack, it is more
robust to the flooding attack than the throttling or dumping
mechanisms, where the censor can drive the amount of suc-
cessful real CRS traffic arbitrarily low.
If the costs of mounting the attack were non-zero then
these would add up to cause the censor to self-limit earlier at
a lower loss of real CRS traffic. This is in contrast to the throt-
tling and dumping mechanism where the censor self-limits the
attack only if there is non-zero cost to the attack.
6.3 Discussion
There are trade-offs between utility and robustness against at-
tack that the CRS designer must carefully evaluate when de-
ciding which traffic allocation mechanism to use.
It is clear that throttling always provides higher utility
than the strictly monotonic solution in the non-adversarial set-
ting. However, we see that monotonic solutions provide posi-
Table 4. Cost-benefit analysis for censor deploying a flooding
attack on the monotonic mechanism. Here, Fab = 0.5, using
traffic ratio R80,4... = 〈0.80, 0.04, 0.04, 0.04, 0.04, 0.04〉, where
CTPreal_loss is the fraction of real CRS traffic blocked, and Lloss is
the fraction of non-circumvention traffic blocked. For an economi-
cally sound flooding attack Cost eff. ≥ Fab=0.5.
CTPR+F CTPreal_loss Lloss Cost eff.
Fab · 1.60 0.264 0.12 0.69
Fab · 1.70 0.225 0.16 0.58
Fab · 1.80 0.200 1.00 0.17
tive circumventor utility, although not as high as the throttling
case, that are robust to attack. So, while we can achieve opti-
mum throughput by throttling, one can not always depend on
these results under all operating scenarios. Indeed, under the
an active censor, the monotonic approach appears more util-
ity maximizing. One way around this limitation is for the CRS
that wishes to retain the optimal results from throttling should
invest in making the cost of mounting the flooding attack not
cost-effective for the censor.
From our limited analysis of protocol ratios we see that
they can affect the scale of the flooding attack. While we leave
a more thorough analysis of identifying optimal protocol ra-
tios for future work, the current observations are still useful
for real-world situations where the number and choice of pro-
tocols to pick from may be constrained, due to reasons such as
lack of implementations and protocols that are blocked from
the outset. The upshot is that even if the CRS designer is
unable to pick her protocols to maximum effect, the strictly
monotonic mechanism provides positive utility and more ro-
bustness to attack over the throttling and dumping mecha-
nisms.
Finally, we note an interesting feature of the game when
CTP > Fab: the censor’s protocol blocking behavior is inde-
pendent of their type, being governed by protocol ratios alone.
We noted this when we analyzed the game when there is a sur-
plus when the CRS is oversubscribed, and when the censor is
flooding the network. This is useful since we can conduct an
analysis of our CRS designs in scenarios where the protocol
distributions are the same, that generalizes across all censor
types.
7 Assumptions and Limitations
We assume that the circumventor is not “spiteful”; that is, they
seek only to maximize the amount of traffic they get through
and do not seek to harm the censor if reduces this amount. In
contrast to this assumption, in some domains players may be
spiteful and derive utility from their competitors’ loss. Some
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works [6, 27] have examined positive or negative externali-
ties incurred by such behavior in popular auction mechanisms.
However, we do not follow this thread and leave it as an avenue
for future work.
Another assumption is that circumventors suffer no loss
from blocked traffic. This is a reflection of those CRS designs
where traffic transportation is best effort and the cost of band-
width is borne by the user of the CRS, where this cost is of-
ten not by the byte but a fixed monthly amount. However, for
censorship regimes where the circumventor incurs a cost in
proportion to their usage, then our results may not necessarily
hold.
We assume that the proportion of the total network traffic
for a protocol is a proxy for how large an effect of interfer-
ing with it would have on the censor’s utility. In reality, other
aspects may also matter (more) such as the protocol’s impor-
tance to commerce, or usefulness for state surveillance, or as
a means of propaganda. While our results may not translate to
these settings, the analysis framework we have developed can
still be applied with some modifications to the players’ utility
functions.
Our numerical analysis tool introduces some small
amount of error due to the discretization of traffic, CTP and
L, to integer values. In reality, the exact values for the traffic
proportions for each protocol CTPi can be fractional values.
The error margin is ∼ 1% of CTP since the actual value
is at most some fraction of a percent above the value found
by the tool. We also test the Fab solution for one protocol
just below the threshold and note that the solution (Scir = A
and Scen = 100) remains stable (i.e., stays the same) as we
approach the threshold and then switches to another strategy
(Scir = B and Scen = 100) as we cross it. This gives confi-
dence that the tool follows the expected behavior.
Our model assumes that the players have perfect informa-
tion; i.e., know the values for Fab, CTPmax, and CTP , and
the protocol traffic distribution R. The values for CTPmax
and CTP can be known by monitoring the network to record
how much traffic flows over its nodes and also to gauge its
capacity. The Tor network is an example of a CRS system
where these values can be known by both players since they
are made publicly available. The protocol traffic distribution
can be learned by surveys that are routinely conducted by en-
tities such as Sandvine, whose report we use in our analysis.
However, Fab is more difficult since the censor does not ex-
plicitly and publicly provide this information. Nonetheless, we
may be able to infer this value by observing the censor’s be-
havior (Scen). Assuming that it does not impact the censor’s
utility function, we may be able to probe the censor by first as-
suming its type, then playing the optimal strategy, and then ob-
serving its response. Since the other values are known, by ob-
serving the censor the circumventor can discover if it is over-
or underestimating Fab.
Our model assumes that the CRS continues to send traf-
fic over protocols that have been blocked by the censor (as
a consequence of CTP > Fab). This seems counterintuitive
since the circumventor would decide to stop wasting that traf-
fic since it will be blocked anyway. However, the consequence
is worse than the wastage of that traffic. As soon as the pro-
tocol is no longer used, the extra surplus traffic has to go over
the remaining protocols, which would lead to some or all of
them being blocked. This outcome of no traffic getting through
is worse than some traffic getting through with some wastage.
Also, the censor would stop blocking the protocol to reduce its
costs; however, we would then want to reuse the protocol. This
leads to the same series of steps where we would redistribute
the traffic over all of the protocols for the optimum solution,
with the aforementioned protocol being blocked.
8 Related Work
Microeconomic approaches of incentive analysis and game-
theoretical models have been adopted in numerous applica-
tions of network security for preventing attacks and designing
adversarial intrusion detection models. In surveys [1, 25, 31]
of the evolution of computer networks and security systems
we see a drastic change from the use of heuristic and ad hoc
solutions, to analytical paradigms that are based on rich game-
theoretic models. This new shift has enabled researchers to
account for players’ incentives and attitudes towards decision
making in various environments.
In the context of censorship resistance systems that are
mainly inspired by peer-to-peer file/media sharing frame-
works, researchers have focused on two orthogonal ap-
proaches: randomized file and functionality sharing where
each node is assigned random resources, and a discretionary
model where peers can choose and modify their precise con-
tributions to the network [2, 3]. Danezis and Anderson [10]
studied these two frameworks and showed that, in contrast
to the initial intuition, the random model is less costly to at-
tack for all possible attacker strategies, and that the cost to
censor a set of nodes is maximized when resources are dis-
tributed according to node preferences. Contemporaneous to
the work in this paper, Tschantz et al. [35] promote the idea
that evaluating censorship resistance designs solely on techni-
cal attributes is shallow and at times intractable and present
game-theoretic analysis as an alternative. Their analysis and
contributions are limited to considering abstract cost functions
and preliminary conclusions about the viability of economic
analysis as a means of evaluating CRS designs. To the best of
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our knowledge, our work is the first to offer a framework for
game-theoretic analysis of censorship resistance on the data
channel in a variety of scenarios.
9 Future Work
There are several avenues of future work following from our
analysis, some of which we outline here. First, the recently de-
veloped field of “security games”, which uses techniques from
game theory and optimization to defend against physical as-
set attackers, such as terrorists [29] or poachers [14] could be
highly applicable, and could provide insight into the optimal
allotment of a censor’s resources toward developing better de-
tection technologies. Second, it would be fruitful to explore
how the behavior, or presence, of the CRS could affect if and
how the censor allocates resources to improve the censorship
apparatus (i.e., the cost/benefit analysis of improving the appa-
ratus) and if there is a way to prevent an escalation of the con-
flict through the careful deployment and use of CRSs. Third,
we would like to develop a methodology for identifying the
censor’s type, to learn the value of Fab, that is rooted in em-
pirical data. One challenge we foresee for collecting empiri-
cal data is that it is difficult to know if our network observa-
tions, and the effects on the data channel, are due to censorship
or other reasons. The output of the various nascent efforts to
identify censorship events in the wild [8, 9, 16, 40] can be a
useful source of data for our framework. One of the results of
our analysis is that protocol usage coordination is necessary
in order to achieve the optimum solution in the CTP > Fab
setting. This assumes that there is some way to achieve this
in real-world CRSs. Unfortunately, most current CRSs are not
designed this way, focusing on one protocol at a time. How-
ever, there are systems like StegoTorus [39] that have the ca-
pability to split traffic over multiple protocols, which would fit
our purpose. It is an open problem to develop a mechanism to
manage circumvention traffic such that it 1) does not cross the
Fab threshold, 2) is distributed across protocols according to
the optimum solution, and 3) is usable in realistic settings.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we focus attention on the censorship games
wherein two rational and self-interested players, namely cen-
sor and circumventor, play their best strategic responses in a
perfect information game. Considering a linear utility model,
we start by analyzing the simplest pure Nash equilibrium anal-
ysis and enrich the model step by step. We then analyze the ex-
ponential utility setting and describe an automated numerical
analysis approach to equilibrium analysis.
Our simple closed-form analysis yields insight about the
existence of Nash equilibria that can be leveraged by CRS
designs. Extending our analysis to more realistic censorship
scenarios, we leveraged automated numerical analysis as an
aid to discovering and analyzing equilibrium points. This ap-
proach has application to real-world CRS-design problems,
namely, of how to select cover protocols effectively and how to
distribute circumvention traffic over them to maximize utility
even in sub-optimal scenarios.
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A Numerical analyzer
Our analyzer models the game setting from subsection 4.2, but
with multiple protocols and the utility functions 14 and 15 in-
stead. We assume that the censor does not have an appara-
tus that can distinguish non-circumvention uses of the proto-
col from uses of the protocol to carry circumvention traffic.
Therefore, the censor must choose to either block a protocol
entirely—blocking both cover traffic (causing false positives)
and the circumventor’s traffic (causing true positives), or leav-
ing it entirely unblocked. The case of an apparatus-enabled
censor is a straightforward extension, where each protocol in
use is split into two: the traffic flagged by the apparatus is
treated as one protocol, and that unflagged is treated as a sec-
ond protocol.
The analyzer conducts a brute-force search for the opti-
mum censor and circumventor strategies by iterating over the
entire strategy space. For each circumvention strategy—i.e.,
distribution of circumvention traffic across the protocols—the
analyzer chooses the censor strategy—i.e., the set of protocols
to block—with the highest utility for the censor. Then from the
entire list of (circumvention strategy, chosen censor strategy)
pairs, the analyzer chooses the one that results in the high-
est utility for the circumventor. This will be the equilibrium
strategy since if either party changes their strategy, they will
decrease their own utility.
An interesting consequence of this model is that the utility
function of the circumventor does not matter, as all they can do
is choose between the collection of scenarios which the cen-
sor has decided to be optimum for a particular strategy of the
circumventor. Therefore, as long as the circumventor’s utility
function is monotonically increasing in terms of the false neg-
ative rate, the same equilibrium will be reached regardless of
the function’s shape.
The analyzer models the relative importance of protocols,
for both the censor and the population in the censor’s SoI,
by utilizing popularity of the protocol by traffic volume. As a
concrete source of information we use the traffic-volume data
from the December 2015 Sandvine survey mentioned in sub-
section 6.2.
Our analyzer makes some simplifying assumptions to re-
duce the computational complexity of calculating the censor’s
utility for all combinations of censor and circumventor strate-
gies. The censor can chose to block any selection of the n tar-
get protocols, resulting in 2n strategies. In the analysis that
follows we model up to six target protocols which means that
there are at most 26 = 64 censor strategies. The circumventor
can choose to send units of traffic in any distribution over the
protocols, but there are still an infinite number of circumven-
tor strategies if we allow any fractional value for the amount
of traffic. So, to reduce the strategy space we quantize all cir-
cumvention traffic into multiples of one percent point up to a
total of one hundred percent points, resulting in at most 2961
circumventor strategies. To clarify, one percent point of cir-
cumvention traffic is equivalent in quantity to 1% ofCTP . We
model a network where the sum of all cover traffic together is
L, and like before L + CTP = 1, which is the whole of the
network traffic.
